

*USE of 26 Oct*  
*DEL's dictation (unedited)*  
*HOLD IN FILE*  
A. Poland.

The Soviet decision to go along with Gomulka's Polish Nationalist Communist state may be reassessed in Moscow because of events in Hungary. Any firmer judgment on this subject must await the conference which is likely to take place shortly in Moscow between Polish and Soviet Communist leaders. Gomulka may be committed to attend this meeting <sup>an</sup> because of ~~his~~ apparent promise given that he would do so if Soviet military forces in Poland returned to their normal stations. Soviet troops did not reach ~~the~~ Warsaw.

B. Soviet military intervention in Budapest may have been due to Moscow's unwillingness to accept a second humiliation. On the other hand it may have been due to the fact that the Polish revolt never took a clear cut cominant anti-Communist character although it was clearly against Soviet <sup>in</sup> domination of Polish national life. On the other hand/the Hungarian revolt the rebels were clearly both anti-Communist and anti-Russian and were unwilling to settle for a Gomulka type government represented by Prime Minister Nagy.

C. The Hungarian regime may demonstrate the inability of moderate nationalist Communist regimes to retain control and this may affect the situation of Gomulka in Warsaw. The circumstances of Soviet military intervention in Budapest are not yet clear. Apparently a frightened Prime Minister of a few hours, Nagy, called for Soviet help and then when he saw the consequences

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endeavored to appease the rebels ~~and the~~ by offering amnesty against the retirement of Soviet forces (and one report said from Hungary). It is evident that the revolt in Budapest took on a far more dangerous character than the similar demonstration in Warsaw and the most serious challenge to Soviet control of a satellite country that it has yet faced. (Tito's defection entirely different type of situation).

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Whether the Tito type of national Communism will prove viable in either Poland or Hungary as a way station towards greater freedom even if the Russians encourage or support it but without dominating it, is uncertain. Tito who welcomed the events in Poland has been silent about developments in Hungary and may well view them with real alarm. In my opinion the peoples of neither Poland, Hungary, nor Yugoslavia would in free elections endorse a Communist regime. Neither Hungary nor Poland ~~could~~ could quickly disengage themselves economically from the Soviet bloc without substantial Western assistance. There would not be, however, any insuperable difficulties for substituting Western for Eastern sources of supply and markets. ~~Finally, there~~

#### China;

There is some evidence that China has welcomed the developments in Poland. Its position regarding Hungary is not yet disclosed but this should be followed closely to see whether ~~any~~ they may not have the first serious rift between China and the USSE.

#### Effect on Soviet Leadership.

For the immediate future in order not to highlight the crisis Soviet leaders will probably struggle to give an outward impression of unity. A turn now would be an admission of serious instability and doctrinal bankruptcy. However, Soviet leadership is on the defensive and Khrushchev

is probably held primarily responsible by his more hard-boiled colleagues and his policies are probably ~~the~~ being subjected to critical review. His Zhukov might have the decisive voice in the choice of a successor. days may be numbered. ~~His successor might be the chief apparent.~~ He is quoted by the press as having stated that he was against any armed intervention in any conflict of any sort. "We prefer peace to war throughout the world -- and that goes for me personally, too." I don't ever want to face the enemy again, not even victoriously alongside allies, since that would involve terrible human losses."